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Colonial companies, indentured labour and imperialism 
1860-1940 
Robert Castle, Jim Hagan and Andrew Wells 
(University of Wollongong) 
The Imperialist Controversy 
The literature on modem imperialism is both immense and inconclusive. The defInition, central facts , archival 
sources, methods, theories and implications of 'imperialism' are subject to endless contestation. The doyen of 
Australian liberal historiography, WK Hancock, was moved to warn nearly half a century ago, 'Imperialism is no 
word for scholars'. Despite his assertion the scholarly and polemical debates continued unabated. 
In recent years the discussion of imperialism has moved in two rather different directions. On the one hand 
the framework fIrst articulated by I.Wallerstein1 and later refmed by ER Wolf2 and G Arrighi,3 has underpinned 
a conception of critical globalisation with a Marxist flavour. Their more or less coherent theoretical and 
historical sweep evokes a sense of the growing market-based connections between Europe, Africa, Latin 
America and Asia from the sixteenth century onwards. Trade and the circulation of raw material, money, 
commodities and workers created the sinews of the all-embracing world market. And this market - the 
forerunner of modem capitalism - carried an imperative that would reshape the world. The implication of this 
spread of the world market is that there were global winners and losers in an international system of commodity 
production and exchange. In this framework imperialism became a later phase of this four-century process as 
European powers competed for global hegemony while tightening their grip on the non-European countries by 
formal annexation and colonial rule. 
The other powerful, but seemingly divergent contribution, has focussed on the employment of traditional 
methods of historical research. It has eschewed the larger theoretical categories of the world-systems writers and 
comparative sociology. Rather it has made considerable empirical progress in understanding the metropolitan 
forces, institutions and personalities that have engineered the various colonial projects. The outstanding 
contribution to this analysis has been Cain and Hopkins in their two-volume history of British Imperialism.4 
Two further exemplars of this approach include White's detailed work on British decolonisation in Malaya and 
Washbrook's book on colonial Madras.5 In these cases the detail of the analysis seems to undercut the radical 
generalisations advanced in the other tradition. White concurs with another historian, ' .. . that the central 
assumption of the neocolonialism argument . .. remains for the moment unverifIable. '6 
There are three major areas of difference in approach and conclusion. In the fIrst place the emphasis moves 
from capitalism as a coherent but impersonal mechanism towards a business, investment and political 
environment full of intrigue, contradiction and forceful personalities. Because the focus is on the actors and 
authors who made the imperial order we are able to understand, even empathise, with the drama of human 
agency. Second, we are quickly made aware of the political processes that shaped colonisation and imperialism, 
and the complex mixture of material, ideological and even idealistic motivations that produced as much 
argument as unity about colonial policy. Last, we come away with an acute sense of contingency in the whole 
imperial venture. It is the complex array of players that determine the outcomes, not any teleology of global 
capitalism. 
In this paper we wish to add a third approach. We concentrate on a particular phase of imperial expans~n, 
1860: I 940, ill partIcular mdustnes, and view the process not from the boardrooms and parliaments of Euro~ 
but from the workers' perspective. We seek to illuminate how and why millions of workers in Asia and some 
I
thOUSands in AustralIa were recruited and inducted into commodity production to meet changing European 
needs. In the process we hope to demonstrate that the broad brush-strokes of the world-system theorists and the 
studies of the more empirically orientated writers of 'Gentlemanly Capitalism' are not as incompatible as might 
fIrst appear. Our focus on labour provides what we believe is the missing link. In order to argue this case we 
have had to rely on example and illustration rather than detailed comparative analysis. 
Labour Demand 
The production and exchange of global commodities has a very long history. In the nineteenth century the 
volume and value of this trade grew rapidly. A global division of labour was becoming more apparent: the raw 
materials for the industrial economies of Europe and the foodstuff they needed for the growing urban 
populations were increasingly produced in the non-European world. Sugar and cotton grown by slave labour 
were the pioneer commodities of this specialisation. In both cases millions of Africans were shipped to supply 
forced labour for plantation economies. In the 1830s pressure to abolish slavery resulted in Britain banning 
slavery at home, in the colonies and in its trade. In the 1860s the United States abolished slavery. The tide was 
turning against the forced relocation of potential workers and their employment in conditions of permanent 
servitude. 
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The demand for sugar and cotton did not abate, and the demand for existing and new products continued to 
increase. Tea, rubber and meat were three important examples. Tea from India began to surpass the demand for 
Chinese tea; demand expanded very quickly in the late nineteenth century. Rubber, which was essential for 
waterproofing clothing, electrical insulation and bicycle (and then motor car) tyres was required in vast 
quantities in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Canned and later frozen meat became a major 
international commodity from the 1880s. The sources of these and other commodities were various, and each of 
the contending industrial powers worked to find secure supplies preferably from their formal colonial 
possessions, or at least from their semi-colonial sphere of influence. Some of these products were dependent on 
tropical climates and specific topography while others like meat required extensive grazing lands. Much 
experimentation, frequently unsuccessful, occurred to find the best match between the product and optimal 
environment. 
In the case of sugar and the expanding tea and rubber industries, there were lessons learnt from the use of 
slave labour. An important conclusion was that plantations using an industrial labour process w.ere the most 
efficient means of production. The plantation was industrial agriculture - it was based on very extensive 
commercial monoculture, with a large and specialised workforce subject to rigorous discipline. It was a dramatic 
break with peasant agriculture where self-sufficiency with a small tradeable surplus was typical. The result was 
the almost complete commodification of production. 
Plantations consumed vast quantities of labour power. They needed vast armies of workers to clear land; to 
bring it into conditions suitable for planting, vast acreages had to be planted, tended and ultimately harvested. 
Furthermore, once harvested, the raw materials were frequently transformed before packing and shipment could 
occur. The beef industry was somewhat different - it required extensive but cheap land for production, a 
relatively skilled workforce and thus did not lend itself to the imposition industrial labour processes. But in all of 
our examples labour was almost impossible to recruit without the employment of coercive or deceptive 
techniques. Neither free labour nor local labour could readily enter these industries given the nature of the work, 
rewards and discipline. Neither slaves nor free wage labour was available for these profitable and strategically 
important industries. The solution seemed to be long-distance recruitment using the indenture system, a 
technique that had preceded slavery in the American colonies, or to use indigenous labour that was already 
denied basic rights as citizen or worker. 
Recruitment at a Distance 
Colonists wishing to establish tea gardens/or rubber plantations usually decided to import their labour from 
distant places. It was not simply that there were not enough locals to supply the scores of thousands of men 
needed to clear the jungle, dig the drains and build the roads. Whether planting tea in Assam, or rubber in 
Indochina,? the newly arrived owners found the local natives unsatisfactory. The tea planters of Assam believed 
they were 'naturally indolent', 'lazy', and 'largely addicted to the use of opium'.B Likewise, rubber planters 
opening up the 'red lands' in south Indochina reported that the Mois who lived there were 'unreliable', would 
turn up to work only when they felt like it, and would go home to their families at night rather than camp out and 
be ready for an early start the next day.9 Whether hunter gatherers, or settled village farmers, local natives 
showed no enthusiasm for converting themselves into disciplined workers labouring at heavy and dangerous 
tasks for wages. 
Besides, the local natives always cost too much. In the ten years before 1810, when 'tea mania' was getting 
under way in Assam, the price of local labour doubled, and its high cost 'would materially affect the profits of 
tea cuItivation'.10 Like the Mois, the Assamese natives had the alternative of resources accessoire, and in the 
opinion of the planters, had to be paid far too much to do work even in their own unsatisfactory way. 
The solution was to recruit workers who came from a considerable distance away. Frequent local famines in 
India supplied workers for the tea gardens of Assam, and the rubber plantations of Malaya; the overpopulated 
Red River Valley in the north ofIndochina supplied recruits for the rubber plantations in the south; the millions 
of the small island of Java for the tobacco plantations of Sumatra. Once arrived, the coolies were isolated. They 
had no resources accessoires, and their missed origins helped ensure their relative docility. 
These people, in law, were not slaves. Technically, they were contractors who had entered voluntarily into an 
agreement to supply a service - their labour - over a fixed period. The legal instrument which they had signed -
or most usually, put their thumbprint to - was called an indenture, and in the eighty years before the Second 
World War, some tens of millions of natives bound themselves to service in this way. 
In Australia, the practice was never widespread, but its essential features reproduced themselves in the 
Protector system. From the 1870s, the Australian colonies adopted this system as a means of regulating the 
employment of Aboriginal labour. Employers wishing to hire Aborigines as workers had to do so through a 
P.rotector appointed to watch over the interests of the Aborigines in his charge. With his approval, the Aborigine 
Sl~ed, or attached his thumbprint, to a document very like what in Asia was called an indenture. Essentially, 
th~s document bound the Coolie or the Aborigine to serve a particular employer for a specified period which 
InIght be as long as five years. It set out rates of pay and hours of work and required the employer to provide 
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shelter, food and medical care. The conditions it set .out could not be varied during the period named, and' 
terms were enforceable at law. Legislation provided penalties for infraction. Its 
F or the employees, these were severe. Section 31 of the Queensland Act authorised a Protector 
To inflict summary punishment by way of imprisonment, not exceeding 14 days, upon Aborigines who in 
the judgement of the Protector are guilty of any crime, serious misconduct, neglect of duty, or gross 
insubordination . . . 11 
, 
The Western Australian Act made it an offence for Aborigines to 'neglect, refuse, desert or quit without the 
consent of their employer', and provided penalties of goal for up to one month. 
There were similar penalties for Indian or Indochinese coolies who broke the terms of their indentures. In 
India, the Workman's Breach of Contract Act of 1859 provided for imprisonment for up to three months with 
hard labour for coolies found guilty of breach of contract.12 In Indochina, a coolie absent from his plantation for 
48 hours or more was deemed to be guilty of desertion, and was liable to imprisonment from six to 60 days.13 
This punitive legislation was no idle interest. Colonial governments supplied police and military assistance in 
tracking down absconders. The planters themselves formed posses, and in Assam retained the right of private 
arrest without warrant until 1908. In Assam the Act of 1859 continued in force until 1926. In Indochina and 
Australia the penal provisions of the legislation continued until the Second World War and after. 
The planters, the estate owners, and the governments that supported them had standard replies ready for those 
who criticised the use of criminal proceedings to discipline a workforce. The use of coercive powers against 
coolies for breaches of indenture, they said, was only fair. The same indenture that compelled work from the 
coolies also laid duties on the employers. They had to provide shelter, food and medical services, and as agencies 
like the International Labour Office took a greater interest, so government regulations compelled the owners to 
spend more on them. Moreover, the costs of recruitment and transport often represented a considerable 
investment. They were entitled to a fair return. 
Colonial governments often took a more altruistic approach. They were inclined to see themselves as 
fulfilling a civilising mission, advancing the natives from their primitive state through the first stages of 
capturing the benefits of the Western world. The French were particularly conscious of themselves as passing on 
their great heritage. 'Our native policy [in Indochina]" said Governor-General Sarraut, is the Declaration of the 
Rights of Man as interpreted by St Vincent de Paul' .14 
The British and the Dutch were also confident that their colonial labour policy was in the natives' best 
interests. In Australia, missionary Protectors often saw work discipline as a pre-condition of Christian 
salvation. 15 
So the work of disciplining native labour even had a quality of nobility to it, especially when there was some 
doubt as to whether coolies and Aborigines were really human. In Assam, according to Sir Bampfylde Fuller, the 
coolies were 'beasts in a menagerie'. As late as 1948, the Member for the Tennant Creek district in the Northern 
Territory of Australia found it necessary to reassure fellow members of the Territory Council that 
the natives ... who after all constitute a majority of the population of the Northern Territory .. . are human 
beings, so the scientists tell us16 
Employers who believed their native workers to be sub-human found it easy to ignore the conditions set out in 
the contract they had signed. In Northern Australia, many employers of Aboriginal labour did not bother 
consulting with their workers' Protector, and did not sign any documents which stipulated the conditions of hire. 
When he visited the Cape York settlement of Coen in 1935 to investigate the dealings of a corrupt Protector, 
Sub-Inspector Collyer wrote 
From the information I have received, I have no hesitation in saying that the employment of Aborigines 
without a permit on agreement, and without payment other than food and clothing, has existed here for 
many years and is regarded as a right. 17 
Even many of .those employers who had signed indentures or agreements did not pay wages in money, or paid at 
a lower rate than the one specified, or paid late and irregularly.18 They also ignored requirements in the 
indentures to supply adequate shelter hygiene and food. On the tea gardens of Assam and the rubber plantations 
of Indochina, employers housed coolies in the barracks built of local softwoods and bamboo. In these. the coolies 
cooked and ate, as well as slept. In rainy weather, the roofs leaked and the floors turned to mud. There was no 
reticulated water supply, and pit latrines were often dangerously close to the communal wall. The rice the planter 
supplied was of poor quality, as well as being inadequate. In the 1930s when regulations required them to supply 
rations other than rice, the fish supplied was often rotten. 19 
Complaining to overseers planters was often risky. In northern Australia, cattle station owners and overseers 
were still inflicting cruel and unusual punishments on their Aboriginal employees as late as the 1950s. Bashing 
the soles of feet of runaways was not usual, but physical assault was not uncommon. Henry Cotton, High 
Commissioner of Assam, noted that some planters, including some of the most 'respectable' applied their own 
summary punishments including imprisonment and beatings with the rattan without reference to magistrates.20 
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An official inspecting Michelin's very large plantation at Phu Rieng in Indochina visited the 'dark house' (the 
pr:i.son) and the hospital in which coolies were recovering from their beatings.21 
The combination of harsh discipline, inadequate shelter, poor food, and hard and dangerous work led to very 
high death rates among coolies. In 1906, the Assam Labour Enquiry Committee reviewed the forty years of the 
indenture system established by the Act of 1865. It accepted an estimate of death rates between 40 per thousand 
for coolies who migrated to Assam before 1891, and 60 per thousand for those who arrived between 1891 and 
1900.22 In 1930, L'Institut Pasteur estimated that the death rate among coolies in south Indochina in the 
previous five years had been between four and five times that of the average population - a statistic which 
becomes even more gruesome when it is remembered that coolies were men in their twenties and thirties who 
had been certified medically fit before they began working on rubber plantations.23 
In Assam, the rise in the death rate was parallelled by a dramatic decrease in the birth rate among the adult 
female population on the tea gardens. In 1882, it had been 133.1 per thousand; in 1904 and 1905 it was 92.1. The 
Assam Labour Enquiry Committee accepted that some of this was due to bad water and bad drainage, some of it 
to abortion, and some of it to insufficient food and inadequate diet.24 Poor nutrition and abortion in turn were 
linked to low wages. 
Forty years later, the anthropologists R M and C H Berndt accepted a commission from pastoralists to 
investigate the declining birth rate among the Aborigines who supplied the workforce for their cattle stations in 
the Northern Territory. The Berndts concluded that the falling birth rate was largely a result of poor food, poor 
shelter and poor health.25 Yet the agreements assented to by the Aboriginal workers and their employers, and 
witnessed by the Aborigines' Protector, had required the provision of adequate food, clothing, shelter and 
medical attention. The Berndts reported that the pastora1ists could 'do what they liked' because of the lack of 
supervision.26 
This was true wherever the indenture system or some variant of it was in operation. When the Western 
Australian government established its protector system in 1883, it appointed one inspector (with a bicycle) to 
police it throughout an area of almost a million square miles. When the Government of Indochina established a 
labour bureau in 1930 to implement its new Labour Code, it appointed six inspectors - a number which was 
quietly reduced to zero during the Great Depression.27 
Failure to staff inspection services adequately was the most obvious outward sign of governmental lack of 
will. In 1882, the Government of India revised the Act governing recruitment of coolies to allow 'free 
contracting' which would remove coolies from the fixed conditions of indenture. It did not work that way. A 
legal loophole in the drafting of the Act turned the entire process of 'free contracting' (in the words of a witness 
at the Assam Labour Enquiry Committee's hearing) into a 'fraud' which had entrapped three quarters of a 
million coolies into indentured service over the next 20 years.28 The officials the government later sent out to 
inspect the tea gardens were junior officials who had no statutory authority, so that the planters were free to 
ignore their recommendation. In Queensland, Protectors were policemen who often resented the unpaid extra 
duty the role required. They responded by ignoring their responsibility, or by colluding with shopkeepers to 
make money out of their power to supervise their wards' spending.29 
Theoretically, coolies in India and Aborigines in Australia had legal redress against these abuses. Defenders 
of the indenture and protector systems often pointed out that coolies and Aborigines were not only British 
subjects; they were British citizens, and that signing an indenture had abrogated none of their rights in law. In 
practice, it was impossible for the native workers to take advantage of them. 
This remained true, even if they understood the nature of the document they had signed, and the means by 
which its requirements might be enforced - which was unlikely. In Assam, coolies who believed their employer 
had breached the indenture could take their case to a magistrate. But the magistrate was 
Amember of a small European community in a distant land who may be playing bridge or billiards with a 
planter one month, or who may be serving under him as a Trooper in the light horse, and who in the next 
month may be called on to try and punish him for cruelty to a contract labourer30 
In Western Australia, many pastoralists were Justices of the Peace, and the government dealt with the problem of 
conflict of interest by an amendment to the Aboriginal Offenders' Act. The amendment removed the 
d~squalification on Justices of the Peace from adjudicating cases in which they had an interest.31 No such 
dIsqualification operated in Indochina, nor was one thought to be necessary. 
The only serious challenges to the abuses of the indenture system came from international bodies like the 
International Labour Office and specifically, in Indochina, from the Gondal Committee of Inquiry. Governments 
:vere able to fend off increasing criticism after the First World War by pointing to legislation which laid 
~~cr~asing r~sponsibility on employers for the welfare of their indentured workforce - and, again in Indochina, a 
Ig~llficant Improvement in the death rate. When the Second World War began, the system had not been 
~~ouSly challenged anywhere except in Assam, where the flooding of the local labour market in the 1930s with 
ee' labourers achieved the indenture system's primary aim of holding down the price oflabour. 
E-:en here, part of the oversupply consisted of coolies originally engaged under indenture. In 1940, wage 
rat~s ill the tea gardens were significantly less than they were outside them, as they had been for the whole 
penod of operation of the indenture system. Its effectiveness in this regard was clear to the Assam Labour 
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Transforming Labour: Proceedings of the Eighth National Labour History Conference - 65 














Enquiry Committee, which had noted that between 1865 and 1901, the rupee had depreciated by one third in re 1 
value, while coolies under indenture worked at fixed rates for the period of contract. 32 This inflationary tren~ 
with some notable accelerations, continued until the thirties. . , 
Though over a much shorter period, the indenture system did much the same service for the rubber planter 
of Indochina. It was not until the late thirties that some of them began to consider that the rigidity . of th: 
indenture system's costs may have been working against them. The majority of planters defended the system 
against the policies of the Popular Front government in Metropolitan France. At the same time, in the Northern 
Territory and Western Australia, very few pastoralists were paying their Aboriginal employees any money wages 
at all. In Assam, wages paid to coolies at best conformed to the Iron Law; in Northern Australia, pastoralists got 
the labour of their Aboriginal employees at below reproduction rates, since they had to maintain themselves 
during the wet season, when work on the cattle stations was either very difficult or impossible. . 
Besides holding down the price of labour, the indenture system had two other great advantages from the 
point of view of the employer. It supplied labourers in the numbers needed when they were needed, and it made 
for a docile workforce. Distance from home, family obligations, a mixture of languages, religions and castes 
made it difficult to protest against the conditions of employment other than through absconding, or individual 
acts of self mutilation. Imprisonment and brutality practised by overseers and either tacitly condoned or actively 
supported by colonial administrations ensured that political combination was virtually impossible. In Assam, 
fewer than a thousand coolies out of a workforce of about a million belonged to any form of trade union; in 
northern Australia, the organisation of Aborigines on cattle stations into an . effective trade union was not even a 
remote possibility. In Indochina, an underground Communist Party network had begun to organise strikes, but its 
day was yet to come, and it had not challenged the system seriously. 
Pauperisation and Profits 
The system of labour recruitment, the labour process and the forms on discipline we have described are 
impossible to justify. While we have emphasised the industrial nature of plantation labour, the deaths, injuries, 
punishments, fmes and humiliations are worse than the typical industrial factory regimes we are familiar with. 
We would have to look to the mining or maritime industries to find similar forms of labour degradation. 
Throughout the plantation systems and into the pastoral industry the wages were set at barely subsistence level. 
Perhaps even more disturbing the workers were frequently incapable of simple biological reproduction and 
lacked the resources to bear and support unproductive children. Over time conditions did improve; indentured 
workers were replaced by increasing numbers of free workers, workers were able to form partnerships and raise 
children, village communities were created and alternative employment and access to arable land eased the 
situation. But for many working on the tea gardens, or in the rubber or sugar plantations the improvements were 
in degree not in kind. These were workers producing goods and profits for the consuming classes in the 
industrial nations. Coolies were not the beneficiaries of the wealth they created - they were ruthlessly exploited. 
From London, Paris and Amsterdam the plantations and their products were viewed differently. The 
propertied classes, indeed the economic elites, diverted a portion of their wealth via partnerships, joint stock 
companies and the shares and debentures into these expanding industries. Some provided the capital that was 
used to establish these industries and purchase the land, labour and capital required for wealth creation. But 
many more simply traded or speculated in the titles to existing or future wealth - bouts of speculative madness 
infected all these colonial ventures. Fortunes were made and occasionally lost to those with access to capital and 
the necessary insider knowledge. 
There can be no definitive way of calculating the value and economic impact of these colonial ventures 
because they were not a set of transactions between autonomous economic units. In fact much of the process was 
undertaken in the continuous space of the imperial economy. Relatively modest flows of investment left the 
imperial centre for the colonies while profits might be reinvested, moved to another colony or repatriated. But 
who measured these flows? How do we assess the value of colonial possessions since the winners and losers 
were so very different? What time frame do we employ to make the calculations? Speculative profits in imperial 
capital markets, the result of high colonial profits, were significant, but they were not measured or recognised as 
a major consequence of colonial production. . 
Joining the world of production and profit were two complex networks of power. One was a system of trade, 
a part of the growing global division of labour. It involved labour recruiters and the provisioners of the 
plantation, and the drivers, rail workers and maritime workers who moved the commodities around the world. 
Once shipped to the heart of the empire another army of factory, transport and retail workers were required to 
manufacture and realise the finished product. That the imperial workers were somewhat better paid and treated 
should not occlude their role in this global system of economic relations. The shareholders, the factory workers 
in England, France or Holland, and the coolies in Asia were in very different positions to reap benefits from this 
global production system. 
It was the second system of power - political and social power - that both created and reinforced these major 
differences of economic power. The imposition of the property relations and the formation of wage labour in the 
colonies were the results of imperial military and administrative coercion. Further the imperial states protected 
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their entrepreneurs and financiers by controlling trade and markets. Thus the movement of surplus labour and the 
r;tes of exploitation across the whole economic process was mirrored in political and legal disparities. For the 
coolies this meant the lack of even the most basic human, political and industrial rights, while the investors 
located elsewhere experienced the luxurious flowering of 'civilisation' identified with gentlemanly capitalism. 
Imperialism as we have described and understood it in the case of selected industries in the late colonial 
period involved the political and economic subjugation of millions of workers for the benefit of the ruling and 
economic elites of imperial powers. In itself this was not a new historical phenomenon; what made it so 
remarkable was the extent and reach of these modem empires and the growing range of techniques of control at 
their disposal. Moreover the strategic survival of these empires in a highly competitive world was dependent on 
the very wealth and power that colonies provided. To that extent modem colonialism and imperial rivalry were a 
qualitative escalation in international forms of exploitation of both labour and nature, and underpinned 
aggressive competition between a handful of imperial powers. 
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